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This thesis addresses the issue of fairness as it relates 
to changing military retired pay. Taxpayers, as well as 
retirees, are seen as central to the discussion of fairness. 
Determination of fairness is accomplished by examining the 
purposes of retired pay. Further evidence of the system's 
fairness (or unfairness) is provided by comparisons with other 
retirement plans. A final perspective on fairness is obtained 
by analyzing how military life has changed since the current 
system was instituted. Each perspective suggests that 
military retired pay is overly generous. This thesis rejects 
the view that retired pay is compensation for the sacrifices 
endured during a military career, and concludes that the 
benefits provided by the current system could be reduced and 
still remain fair to retirees. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   THE PROBLEM 
In 1994, the military retirement system cost U.S. 
taxpayers $26.8 billion. Next to Medicaid (which serves over 
25 million people), the military retirement program (which 
benefits 1.6 million retirees) is the most expensive of all 
federal entitlement programs financed exclusively from general 
revenues.  (Gansler, 1991, p. 297) 
Since 1965—when any World War II veterans were eligible 
to retire—costs have increased nearly twenty-fold. This 
astronomical increase in retirement obligations and 
expenditures reflects the rising number of military retirees, 
as shown in Table 1-1. 
As of 1994, the number of military retirees equaled the 
number of active duty service members. Beginning in 1995, the 
number of retirees actually exceeded the number of persons on 
active duty, which totaled about 1.5 million. 
Unfortunately, the post-Cold War personnel drawdown will 
not have a significant impact on the number of future 
retirees. The Department of Defense (1993, p. L-8) projects 
the number of retirees to peak at 1.7 million in 2010, decline 
only slightly (to 1.64 million) by 2043, and then rise again 






















Source: Department of Defense, Statistical   Report   on   the 
Military Retirement System,   1994, p. 8. 
In today's environment of constrained federal budgets, 
these numbers invite scrutiny of military retirement 
provisions. Cost-conscious members of Congress are sure to 
see military retirement as an opportunity for savings. As 
with any entitlement, military retirees are certain to feel 
"entitled" to the present system. Loud voices will cite 
fairness as the reason their program should not be cut. This 
thesis examines the issue of fairness as it relates to 
changing military retirement. It does not judge the merit of 
any specific proposal for change. Rather, it identifies and 
analyzes the various principles that should guide the 
development of any proposed change. 
B.  THE PEOPLE 
Fairness is not a one-dimensional issue. While most 
discussions of military retirement have focused on the 
retirees, two other groups must also be considered. First, is 
the large number of military non-retirees. The unique 
structure of the military system ensures that relatively few 
people who enter the service will remain long enough to 
collect benefits. The argument could be made that retirees 
receive their benefits at the expense of non-retirees. For 
example, an editorial in Navy Times (November 18, 1991) 
states: "The unfairness of this [retirement] system generally 
escapes the notice of anyone other than service people who, 
after serving honorably for five, 10, or 15 years, leave the 
military with nothing but a handshake." 
A more obvious group concerned with the fairness of 
military retirement is the taxpayers. Fairness to taxpayers 
dictates that they get their money's worth from any federal 
program. A $26.8 billion program must be as cost-effective as 
possible while still accomplishing its goals. Therefore, any 
discussion of fairness to retirees must also consider fairness 
to taxpayers. 
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C.  COMMON CRITICISMS 
Numerous critics over the years have questioned the young 
age at which military members can retire with full benefits. 
Officers who retired during 1994 were 45 years old on average; 
at the same time, the typical enlisted retiree was less than 
41. Owing to today's life expectancies, the average retiree 
in 1994 will receive an annuity for between 34 and 36 years. 
(DoD, 1994, pp. 135, 286) This long period over which 
inflation-adjusted benefits are received is the main reason 
for the high cost of military retirement. 
Other criticisms of military retirement include its 
generous level of annual benefits; its non-contributory 
nature; its all-or-nothing vesting at 20 years; and the 
incentive it produces to leave the service shortly after 
becoming retirement-eligible.   As Gansler (1991, p. 298) 
notes, 
Perhaps the worst aspect of the military retirement 
program is that its incentives work against the 
armed services' manpower needs and military- 
readiness goals. They encourage the most skilled 
officers to retire just when they are reaching the 
peaks of their careers, rather than to continue 
serving the country. 
None of these criticisms are new.  The next section 
provides a brief overview of numerous studies from the past 
several decades that have addressed some of these issues. 
D.  HISTORY 
In 1986, Congress implemented the Military Retirement 
Reform Act. Commonly known as REDUX (for reduction of 
benefits), the Act made several substantial changes to the 
manner in which retired pay is calculated. (These changes are 
discussed later in this chapter.) 
REDUX was inspired by eight major studies of the 
retirement system that had been conducted over the previous 18 
years.  These studies include: 
• 1969, First Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation (QRMC) 
• 1971, Interagency Committee (IAC) on Uniformed 
Services Retirement and Survivor Benefits 
• 1974, proposed Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) 
• 1976, Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) 
• 1978, President's Commission on Military Compensation 
(PCMC) 
• 1979, proposed Uniformed Services Retirement Benefits 
Act (USRBA) 
• 1984, President's Private Sector Survey on Cost 
Control (PPSSCC) 
• 1984, Fifth QRMC 
When compared with the specific proposals of any of these 
studies, the changes made by REDUX were relatively mild.  In 
A 
fact, Asch and Warner (1993, p. 26) assert, "REDUX was a 
compromise aimed at reducing the cost of the retirement system 
without fundamentally altering its structure." 
The fundamental structure to which they refer is that of 
immediate annuities after 20 years of service (YOS). A common 
theme in these studies is the use of a "two-tier" system, 
whereby annuities are substantially reduced (or eliminated) 
prior to old-age.  With the exception of the First and Fifth 
QRMC, all of the studies recommended that service members be 
vested prior to 20 YOS (usually ten). Every study except the 
Fifth QRMC recommended a social security offset; that is, 
military retired pay would be reduced once social security 
benefits are received.  A few more notable recommendations 
include: 
• Members must contribute 6.5 percent of pay.  (First 
QRMC) 
• Two percent reduction for each year under aqe 60. 
(IAC) 
• Require 30 YOS to retire for non-combat arms.  (DMC) 
• Annuities begin at age 60, with lump sum of two years 
pay at separation.  (PCMC) 
• Annuities begin at age 55, with decreasing transition 
payments for five years after retirement.  (PPSSCC) 
This brief discussion illustrates that concern over 
military retirement pay is not a new issue aimed at the 
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current budget crisis. Rather, each time the system is 
studied in detail, it is found to be inappropriate in numerous 
areas. This holds true whether the study is appointed by the 
Executive Branch, Congress, or the Department of Defense 
(DoD). Several major reforms actually became legislative 
proposals, only to fade and die in Congress. Since the 
passage of REDUX in 1986, no major proposals have emerged. 
However, new reforms will undoubtedly be suggested in the 
future. Some might argue that another change should not 
follow too closely on the heels of REDUX. But REDUX did not 
implement changes of the nature and magnitude recommended by 
eight previous studies; therefore, it provides a rather weak 
shield against future changes. 
E.  THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Due to changes made to the military retirement system in 
1980 and 1986, three systems are actually operating at the 
present time. First of all, people who entered the military 
prior to September 8, 1980 receive retired pay at the rate of 
2.5 percent of final basic pay for each year of service. This 
formula equates to the well-known 50 percent of basic pay at 
20 years, and 75 percent at 30 years. Benefits are fully 
adjusted for inflation each year. 
A 
In September 1980, the ''High-3" system became law. It is 
identical to the previous system except that calculations are 
made on an individual's high three years' average basic pay 
rather than final basic pay.  The 1980 change obviously did 
not constitute an overhaul of the retirement system.  It was 
simply a moderate cost-cutting measure, applicable only to 
retirees who entered the military after its implementation. 
As such, savings would not be realized for another 20 years. 
As mentioned previously,  REDUX implemented several 
substantial changes that became effective August l, 1986. 
Realizing that the previous systems provide tremendous 
incentive to retire shortly after serving 20 years, REDUX 
calculates retired pay as two percent (as opposed to 2.5) of 
basic pay for each year of service up to 20.  Retired pay is 
then increased by 3.5 percent (instead of 2.5) for each year 
over 20.  Thus, REDUX provides a significant incentive to 
serve past 20 years, as a 20-year retiree receives 40 percent 
of high-3 basic pay, while a 30-year retiree still receives 75 
percent.  Under REDUX, annual adjustments for inflation are 
reduced to one percent below the growth in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI).  At age 62, benefits are restored to the level 
they would  have  been  with  full  indexing;  thereafter, 
adjustments revert to the CPI minus one percent rule.  Table 
1-2 juxtaposes the three systems. 
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Table 1-2 
Annual Retired Pay Under the Three Current Military 
Retirement Systems, 1992 
Grade/YOS Pre-1980 High-3 REDUX 
0-4/20 $22,435 $20,852 $16,681 
0-5/22 $28,518 $26,965 $23,043 
0-6/26 $39,417 $37,542 $35,232 
O-7/30 $56,144 $53,536 $53,536 
E-7/20 $12,029 $11,320 $9,056 
E-8/25 $18,227 $17,105 $15,737 
E-9/30 $27,294 $26,110 $26,110 
Source: Asch and Warner, 1994, p. 46. 
Both High-3 and REDUX achieved cost savings over the 
system they replaced. REDUX was more comprehensive in that it 
also addressed a manpower problem. Furthermore, it 
acknowledged the appropriateness of a two-tier system that 
distinguishes between a retiree's second-career and old-age 
phases. 
Future proposals to change the retirement system cannot 
be too narrowly focused if the change is to be meaningful and 
lasting. The High-3 change of 1980 was concerned primarily 
with saving a few dollars without angering anybody. To this 
extent, it was successful, but the narrow focus invited an 
even bigger change just six years later. 
A 
In light of the criticisms presented earlier in this 
chapter, calls to modify REDUX will undoubtedly be heard in 
the future. The success of any new change will depend upon 
how well reformers address important aspects of the retirement 
system: specifically, its costs, the needs of the Services, 
and fairness to all concerned. The best way to frame any such 
proposal is to determine what the retirement system intends to 
accomplish. 
10 
II.  PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
Meaningful discussion of military retirement reform 
cannot begin without a thorough understanding of the system's 
purpose. This basic premise is not contentious, but the 
ferocity of reaction from retirees when confronted with a 
relatively minor proposed change indicates that the purpose of 
retirement pay may be grossly misunderstood. A plethora of 
recent letters to Navy Times, for example, suggests that many 
military members view retired pay as a reward for the 
hardships they endured during a career of long and faithful 
service. 
This problem of perspective is not confined to the 
current debate over retirement. Cooper (1977, p. 375) laments 
that "discussions about the problems have tended to focus on 
retirement for retirement's sake, rather than upon the role 
that retirement ought to assume, first, relative to other 
components of the compensation package, and second, in the 
larger context of force management." 
Cooper's notion is supported by the explicit statements 
from various government commissions that have reviewed the 
retirement system during the past several decades. They 
consistently indicate that the idea of a reward for long 
service has little bearing on retirement pay. The theme of 
force management as the primary purpose of the retirement 
11 
system appears repeatedly. Additionally, economic theory 
helps explain why retired pay is structured uniquely in the 
military, and why the current arrangement is not necessarily 
the best one. Thus,, economic theory also supports the notion 
that the primary purpose of retired pay is simply to help 
shape the force. 
A.  GOVERNMENT STUDIES 
Both government and private studies of military 
retirement attempt to define the purpose of the system before 
engaging in their analytical work. That is, of course, as it 
should be; yet, enormous confusion would result if each study 
formulated its own purpose for the system. Fortunately, most 
research tends to draw upon a small handful of prominent 
government studies. Foremost among these reports are the 1948 
Career Compensation for the Uniformed Services (or the Hook 
Commission Report), the Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation   (QRMC), and the Seventh QRMC. 
1.  The Hook Commission 
The end of World War II necessitated a major review of 
military compensation. This comprehensive study—which 
resulted in the Hook Commission Report—did not mince words 
when discussing the purpose of the retirement system: 
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... a sound retirement system is essential to 
solving the superannuation problem. The services 
must be kept young, vigorous, and efficient; a 
sound retirement plan with a proper compulsory 
retirement age will permit youth and brains to rise 
to the top in time to be effective.. .This 
vitalization purpose is not new; it was the 
fundamental premise of the present retirement 
system when it was established 80 years ago. Other 
concepts of fair treatment and the traditional 
concepts of retirement for those taking up the 
profession of arms are also important and have been 
given consideration but the Commission does not 
consider them to be controlling. (Asch and Warner, 
1994, p. 22) 
Even with the recent completion of a war that caused untold 
grief and hardship for millions of Americans, the Commission 
specifically addressed the fairness issue and relegated it to 
secondary importance. 
2.  The Fifth QRMC 
The Fifth QRMC (1984) was charged with examining the 
retirement system, and it subseguently proposed substantial 
changes that became law in 1986. Its stated purpose for the 
retirement system was "to support and complement the manpower 
force management requirements of the Services in order to meet 
national security objectives." (Fifth QRMC, 1984, p. 1-1) 
However, the Fifth QRMC expanded on this basic purpose. It 
reiterated the "youth and vigor" requirement set forth by the 




• Recognize the arduous nature of military service 
• Maintain a mobilization base 
• Provide for financial security in old age 
• Encourage maximum career length consistent with needs 
• Be fair to the service member and taxpayer 
• Allow service member to plan for the future 
• Provide for the equitable treatment of all retirees 
These purposes are both illuminating and confusing. 
Clearly, the Fifth QRMC is sensitive to the individual. 
Although force management is still stated as the system's 
foremost goal, fairness and equity are also given explicit 
consideration. But interpretation of these considerations is 
difficult. For example, "equitable treatment" is not defined 
at all.  Under "planning for the future," the Review states 
that the purchasing power of retirement pay should be 
protected against inflation.  However, the Fifth QRMC itself 
recommended a reduced annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) 
for retirees, which later became law.  So, the Review should 
have clarified what it intended with some of its secondary 
purposes.  Additional problems with the interpretation of 
these broad statements are discussed below. 
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3.  Seventh QRMC 
The Seventh QRMC (1992) did not focus primarily on 
retirement. However, it did take the principles of 
compensation outlined by the Fifth QRMC and further expand 
upon them. Unfortunately, this expansion does not serve to 
clarify the ambiguous purposes outlined by the Fifth QRMC. 
For example, the Seventh QRMC notes that officially recognized 
principles could be used by Congress and the Department of 
Defense to support or defend proposed changes. Herein lies 
the problem: the lengthy set of principles presented by the 
Seventh QRMC are so broad as to allow either support or 
rejection of the same proposed change! For instance, the 
Seventh QRMC states that pay should.be no higher than needed 
to achieve recruiting and retention goals. This would support 
the proposal of calculating retired pay on the average of the 
last year's pay (High-1) rather than on pay at the date of 
retirement (provided retention would not suffer). But on the 
very next page, the Review (1992, GSP-F, p. 3) states that the 
pay system "generally must provide the lifetime remuneration 
promised at the outset of a member's career." This principle 
clearly supports retaining the status quo. 
15 
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B.  ECONOMIC THEORY 
l.  Internal Labor Market 
The military's unique needs dictate that nearly all 
hiring be done at the entry level.  Thus, an internal  labor 
market  exists, whereby all promotions occur from within the 
organization—lateral entry is rare.  This lack of lateral 
entry constitutes a major difference between the military and 
civilian firms with regard to retirement systems.   The 
civilian firms generally are not as concerned with maintaining 
"youth and vigor," thus lessening the need to generate 
turnover among older employees.   (Asch and Warner, 1994, p. 
20)   Does the military's retirement system effectively 
generate turnover among older "employees" to maintain the 
youth of the force? Asch and Warner (1994, p. 16) calculate 
that the average time served after becoming eligible for 
retirement is only one year for enlisted members and about 
four years for officers. In fact, the incentive to leave once 
vested is so strong the retirement formula was changed in 1986 
to encourage retention beyond twenty years.  Service members 
typically look at serving past twenty years as "working for 
half-pay."  (Congressional Budget Office, 1984, p. 18) 
The 1986 change does not address a more fundamental 
question. If the lure of retirement pay is so strong that 
almost no voluntary separation occurs between the tenth and 
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twentieth year of service (Asch and Warner, 1994, p. 9), does 
this logically imply that the level of retired pay could be 
reduced without raising mid-career separations to an 
unacceptable level? The answer should be "yes," since 
everybody with ten through nineteen years of service is 
obviously not operating "on the margin" with respect to a 
quitting decision. 
Entrants to the military in 1986 are not quite halfway to 
their retirement eligibility point, so their retention 
behavior from ten through nineteen years of service is yet to 
be seen. But, if their behavior remains similar to that of 
current mid-careerists, little justification would remain for 
not changing the retirement system further. Even after 
examining various equity issues surrounding the military 
retirement system, the Congressional Budget Office (1984, p. 
18) concluded that "retention of the current system is not 
justified if manpower goals could be adequately met under a 
less costly system." (The applicability of this statement is 
not confined to the 1984 debate. The fundamental principle is 
timeless.) 
2.  Consequences of the Current System 
The attractiveness of military retirement pay produces a 
force structure containing too many mid-careerists. (Asch and 
Warner, 1993, p. 3)  Numerous studies have addressed the 
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"implicit contract» that the retirement system makes with mid- 
careerists. The services are understandably reluctant to 
separate mid-careerists due to the large financial impact that 
the loss of retirement benefits would cause. Table 2-1 
reveals the lack of a "pyramid» length-of-service distribution 
often associated with the military. Rather, the strong pull 
of retirement, coupled with reluctance to separate members 
involuntarily, is evidenced by the nearly constant percentages 
from years twelve through twenty. 
3.  Deferred Compensation 
Military retirement pay is often thought of as deferred 
compensation.    But serious misunderstanding of this important 
economic concept often results.  Flanagan et al. (1984, p. 
280) explains that time-based systems of compensation are 
instituted by the firm to motivate hard work over a long 
period of time.  The effectiveness of deferred compensation 
lies in the fact that rewards are given only after diligent 
effort has been expended by the worker, who has been observed 
by the employer for a long time.  Pensions, then, represent 
the equivalent of a deferred payment at the end of a career. 
Flanagan et al. (1984, p. 284) further state: "The strongest 
incentives for diligence under a pension scheme would exist if 
the pension were not vested." 
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Table 2-1 
Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Military Personnel by 
Length-of-Service Increment, 1993 















Over 24 1.3 
All Years 100.0 
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Valuation of the 
Military Retirement System,   1993, p. C-9. 
19 
The military retirement system is a classic example of 
using deferred payments to motivate hard work throughout a 
career. Combined with "up-or-outM policies, the retirement 
system ensures that military members who survive to retirement 
have been very productive over the years. This process also 
ensures some degree of seif-sorting, whereby only people who 
believe they have the skills and abilities to survive for a 
whole career will decide to stay early on, while the others 
will leave.  (Asch and Warner, 1994, p. 21) 
So, the military uses its retirement system as deferred 
compensation to induce desired behavior from service members 
throughout their careers, just as economic theory dictates. 
Confusion arises when service members view retirement pay as 
compensation for the rigors endured during a military career. 
Asch and Warner (1994, p. 30) quote the First QRMC on this 
subj ect: 
The argument that an additional increment should be 
included in the retirement annuity for the extra 
hazards, rigors, and inconveniences of military 
service was rejected on the grounds that inclusion 
of such an increment would be: 
• inequitable, because only those military members 
who stayed until retirement would receive it... 
Common sense plainly reveals that the rigors mentioned 
are endured by all  service members, not just those who retire. 
In fact, millions of service members, including those who have 
fought in wars, have left the military before retirement; at 
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the same time, many retirees may have actually endured fewer 
rigors than non-retirees. So, retirement pay cannot be a 
reward for these rigors; otherwise, as pointed out by the 
First QRMC, the system would be grossly unfair to non- 
retirees. The complete misunderstanding of the economic 
concept of deferred compensation is what leads many officers 
to defend the current system with uninformed and overly 
emotional letters to media outlets such as Navy Times. (Oct. 
2, 1995, p. 34 provides several examples) 
Clearly, military retirement pay encourages people to 
leave the service after 20 years. It also encourages 
departure early in a career for service members who doubt 
their ability to remain for 20 years. After extensive 
research on the retirement system, Asch and Warner (1993, p. 
18) conclude: "So if there is a distinctive (if not unique) 
purpose for military retired pay, inducing voluntary 
separations at the appropriate points...must be it." 
C.  SUMMARY OF PURPOSE 
This discussion about the purpose of the retirement 
system is necessary before considering any proposed changes. 
Changes that conflict with the primary purpose of the system 
should be challenged, and changes that support the purpose of 
the system should be given serious consideration, especially 
21 
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if the change offers savings to the taxpayer. This process of 
considering the "good" and challenging the "bad" would be 
strengthened with a more succinct set of guiding principles 
and purposes for the retirement system. The Seventh QRMCs 
list is far too broad and ambiguous. Despite the prevailing 
climate of political correctness, little benefit is derived 
from explicitly stating equity as a goal of the system. 
Equity should be a desirable by-product of any policy; no 
properly designed policy should ever be instituted with the 
goal of creating inequity. 
Government studies of military retirement consistently 
state that force management is the primary purpose of the 
system. Economic theory helps explain why this is so. 
Meaningful discussion of military retirement reform must 
consider this primary purpose first; secondary purposes should 
be given lesser consideration. 
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Ill.  COMPARISONS 
Determining the purpose of the military retirement system 
still does not disclose what the actual levels of retired pay 
should be. Insight into that question is often obtained 
through comparisons with other systems, most notably foreign 
military retirement systems and U.S. private pension plans. 
(Distinctions need not be made with Civil Service plans, since 
they can be viewed as comparable to those in the private 
sector.)  (Fifth QRMC, 1984, p. 1-7) 
The first comprehensive study to compare the U.S. 
military retirement system with that of foreign countries was 
done by the Third QRMC in 1976. In 1983, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and the National Defense University 
separately undertook similar studies; and in 1992 the Seventh 
QRMC included a Global Subject Paper on foreign comparisons. 
An extensive review of military and private retirement systems 
was made by the President's Private Sector Study on Cost 
Control (PPSSCC) in 1984. Simply making comparisons between 
systems is a fairly straightforward task. The difficulty lies 
in judging whether the comparison provides enough quality 
information upon which to base a change to our own system. 
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A.  USEFULNESS OF COMPARISONS 
Though comparisons with other systems seem very 
reasonable, the approach is fraught with complications. A 
truly valid comparison would have to be made with all other 
factors remaining constant, which is obviously impractical. 
Even though the comparisons are made with other "developed" 
countries, the differences among them are enormous. Some of 
the differences that make retirement comparisons difficult 
include: 
• Societal values 
• Political form 
• Alternative employment opportunities 
• Integration with other state programs 
• Mobilization status of retirees 
Most studies that undertake a comparison with foreign 
systems acknowledge this difficulty. For example, the Fifth 
QRMC (1984, p. VTI-29) states: »The complexity of the 
different retirement systems... soon turn specific comparisons 
into an exercise of mental gymnastics." Similarly, the 
Seventh QRMC (1992, GSP-A, p. 1) admits that "wide 
differences...made it difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions." 
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Nevertheless, these difficulties do not completely 
invalidate the comparisons. Although there are obvious 
problems in comparing specific features from specific 
countries, overall trends and concepts can be obtained that 
are useful in examining the U.S. system. 
Similarly, the comparison with U.S. private plans can 
provide insight, even though military service is substantially 
different than typical civilian employment. As discussed in 
Chapter II, the purpose of each retirement system mat also 
differ markedly. Despite the "superficial resemblance" 
between the military and civilian plans, the Military 
Compensation Background Papers (1991, p. 447) note that 
military retirees are subject to recall to active duty, and 
they remain fully subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. These differences, then, could serve to justify some 
disparity between the systems. But if the standard of 
"comparable to the best" private sector plan (PPSSCC, 1984, p. 
III-281) is accepted, then the differences should not be too 
large. 
B.  VARIOUS PLANS 
1.  Foreign Military Plans 
The nations most often chosen for comparison with the 
U.S.  are Australia,  Canada,  Great Britain,  France,  and 
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Germany. Highlights from the GAO study (as reported in the 
Fifth QRMC, 1984, p. VII-29) include the following general 
observations about foreign military retirees: 
• Retirement age is higher than for U.S. counterparts. 
• Members must contribute to the plan and/or have their 
military pension reduced under national social 
security plan. 
• Vesting is accomplished prior to 20 years. 
• Cost-of-living adjustments are either partial or 
delayed until age 55. 
• Reserve retirement does not exist. 
The Fifth QRMC (1984, p. VII-29) concludes that, with the 
exception of the Australian system, "the early [20-year] 
retirement provisions are not as attractive as the U.S. system 
and do not encourage many early retirements." The 
Congressional Budget Office (1984, p. 31) voices a similar 
conclusion: "In most cases other countries1 military 
retirement plans are considerably less generous than the 
current American military retirement system, especially for 
2 0-year retirees." 
2.  U.S. Private Plans 
The General Accounting Office used the results of five 
private-sector surveys to compile a short list of features 
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common to non-federal retirement programs.  (GAO/OCG-84-2, 
1984, p. ii)  These common features include: 
• Vesting is accomplished after ten years. 
• Benefits are integrated with social security. 
• Five-year average salary is used to compute benefits. 
• Employee contributions are not reguired. 
• Full benefits are not available until age 62. 
• Reduced benefits are available at age 55. 
• COLAs average just 38 percent of inflation. 
Clearly, military retirement is more lucrative on most 
points. When total lifetime retirement earnings are 
calculated, the generosity of the military system is readily 
apparent. Binkin and Kyriakopoulos (1981, p. 63) calculated 
that lifetime retirement pay (for a typical enlisted person) 
is 16 times greater than that from a typical private firm, and 
nearly three times better than retirement from a hazardous 
occupation such as law enforcement or fire fighting. The 
PPSSCC (1984, p. III-286) made more rigorous calculations and 
determined that the benefit level of the service plan is six 
times as great as the best private sector plans. The Fifth 
QRMC (1984, p. VII-35) made additional calculations to correct 
for demographic and economic assumptions, but still concluded 
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that the military retirement system is at least twice as 
costly as a comparable private plan would be. 
C.  INSIGHTS 
This chapter attempts to capture the spirit of many in- 
depth studies of the military retirement system compared with 
other plans.  The consistent and unambiguous conclusion is 
that the U.S. military retirement system is more generous than 
those of most foreign nations (the only possible exception is 
Australia), and much more generous than U.S. private plans. 
This conclusion is important because it helps shape the notion 
of what is fair.  Ultimately, the concept of fairness has 
meaning only relative to other people. A completely objective 
notion of fairness cannot exist, which is why comparisons are 
made in the first place.  The comparisons, then, provide one 
important criterion for judging questions of fairness.  When 
combined with other criteria from the next chapter,  a 
background can be established for meaningful evaluation of the 
fairness of proposed changes to the retirement system. 
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IV.  THE ISSUE OF FAIRNESS 
Any attempt to determine the fairness of a change to the 
retirement system is problematic. "Fair" means different 
things to different people; and, as various studies have 
mentioned, the retirement system must be fair to the service 
member as well as the taxpayer. Therefore, a working 
definition must be established to guide judgment on the issue. 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976, p. 411) provides a 
starting point by distinguishing between the concepts of fair, 
just, equitable, impartial, unbiased, dispassionate, and 
objective. All of these concepts share the element of "free 
from favor toward either or any side." The individual 
definitions stress that a fair judgment must be free from 
emotional involvement. Therein lies the problem—the 
retirement system evokes tremendous emotion from people who 
have spent 20 to 30 years in uniform. So, a notion of 
fairness is needed that is more rigorous than a simple 
definition. That notion is provided in the next section, 
followed by various other ideas that are central to the issue 




A.  EQUITY THEORY 
In 1965, organizational psychologist J.S. Adams developed 
an "Equity Theory» to explain how individuals evaluate the 
fairness of their treatment within an organization.  (Organ, 
1988, p. 69)  The theory states that people obtain the ratio 
of their "outcomes» to their "inputs," and then compare the 
ratio to that of another comparable person.  Outcomes are 
anything of value derived from the organization: pay, 
prestige, awards, retirement benefits, etc.   Inputs are 
anything the individual brings to the organization: ability, 
effort, seniority, education, etc. Fairness is perceived when 
a person's Outcome/Input ratio is equal to that of the 
comparable person. 
Equity theory, then, can help determine what is perceived 
as fair by service members with regard to changes in 
retirement pay. The important question becomes one of 
determining just who the "comparable person" should be. 
Chapter III offered two such persons—a foreign military 
counterpart and a typical American worker. In each case, one 
aspect of outcomes (retirement pay) was found to be greater 
for the U.S. service member. But the idea of a service member 
comparing his or her Outcome/Input ratio to that of a foreign 
military person is not very plausible. In fact, the service 
member probably does not even contrast the ratio to that of a 
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comparable civilian. Organ (1988, p. 74) cites research that 
found  an  "overwhelming  tendency"  for  people  to  make 
comparisons with others from within the same organization. He 
states: 
Perceived unfairness resonates more shrilly as it 
strikes at lower levels, most notably in the group 
in which we interact, somewhat less so in 
comparisons with contiguous groups or units. 
Thus, equity theory has implications for the retirement 
system.  If pay is changed such that the Outcome/Input ratio 
is lower (due to a smaller numerator) , perceived unfairness is 
not likely to be overwhelming, provided the change applies to 
everyone within the organization. Another important factor is 
what Organ (1988, p. 74) refers to as "the temporal dimension 
of fairness."   He states:  "What might otherwise seem 
criminally unjust in the short run might be absorbed without 
a whimper in a longer framework."  Any concerns about the 
perceived unfairness of a change must consider this temporal 
dimension. Although emotions are intense during any debate on 
retired pay, a change would not likely produce the "chronic, 
action-arousing sense of injustice" that Organ (1988, p. 65) 
says is necessary before an "unfair" situation leads to a 
decision to leave the organization. 
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B.  IMPLICIT CONTRACTS 
A unique feature of the military retirement system is its 
"cliff-vesting" provision.  That is, members who separate 
prior to 20 years of service (YOS) are not entitled to any 
retirement benefits, while those with at least 20 YOS are 
fully vested.  Many service members believe that this cliff- 
vesting feature has created an "implicit contract" with DoD. 
Under this implicit contract, 
...military personnel have come to expect that once 
they have gained six or eight years of tenure, they 
will be virtually guaranteed the opportunity to 
serve for twenty years and qualify for a retirement 
annuity.  (Mehay and Hogan, 1995, p. 3) 
Although the lack of an explicit legal contract could be 
cited to absolve DoD from the obligation of retaining mid- 
career personnel, the traditions of the services have 
generally validated the notion of an implicit contract. For 
instance, the Army's Qualitative Management Program (QMP) was 
established to involuntarily separate the lowest performers in 
grades E-5 through E-9 each year. But the QMP board selects 
only those who have already served at least 20 years. (Asch 
and Warner, 1993, p. 22) 
An extremely vivid acknowledgement of the implicit 
contract with mid-careerists is DoD's use of separation 
incentives to accomplish its force downsizing goals from 1992 
through 1995.  As Mehay and Hogan (1995, p. 4) note: 
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Using reductions-in-force (RIF's) would have broken 
the implicit long-term contract with career 
personnel, imposing significant losses of pension 
wealth....The potential loss of reputation as an 
employer for the Defense Department may have 
created future recruiting and retention problems. 
To avoid these problems, the Department of 
Defense introduced a separation bonus to induce 
selected careerists to resign voluntarily prior to 
becoming retirement-eligible. 
Thus, DoD spent hundreds of millions of dollars to honor the 
implicit contract, even though the need for a dramatically 
smaller force was already recognized and accepted. 
C.  IMPLICIT PROMISES 
The point of the foregoing discussion is to distinguish 
between the implicit contract made to mid-careerists, and 
implicit promises so often mentioned in the debate over 
retirement. Although often used interchangeably in the 
literature, this paper distinguishes between the terms 
implicit contract and implicit promise. The implicit contract 
described above is well-established, while the notion of an 
implicit promise appears to be a tool of expedience, invoked 
by those wishing to retain the status quo. 
In the ongoing debate over COLAs, the president of The 
Retired Officers Association (TROA) cites "the longstanding 
verbal and written COLA promises the government made to 
generations of members in uniform." (Maze, April 10, 1995, p. 
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6) The nature of these promises is unclear, but TROA's 
assertion is not completely without merit. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, the Fifth QRMC states that the purchasing power of 
retired pay should be protected against inflation. This 
obviously is not intended to mean full protection, however, 
since the Fifth QRMC recommended a reduced COLA. 
The Seventh QRMC (1992, GSP-F, p. 11) adds fuel to the 
notion of implicit promises by stating that any significant 
compensation policy change should apply only to new entrants. 
The implication is that no major change to the retirement 
system should affect anyone already on active duty. Thus, the 
concept of grandfathering—or exempting persons already 
subject to the old system— is seen as central to the issue of 
fairness.  Indeed, most major studies of retirement reform 
since 1969 have recommended grandfathering all or most active 
duty personnel.  (Congressional Budget Office, 1984, p. xvi) 
Nevertheless, the great care taken to protect persons 
already on active duty seems somewhat unreasonable. Numerous 
studies have found that retirement benefits begin to influence 
the retention decision no earlier than the sixth to eighth 
year of service.   (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1981, p. 70) 
Therefore, a grandfathering provision that extends back just 
12 to 14 years (versus 20) is not likely to have much of an 
effect on retention. When considering raising the retirement 
age for social security, the President's Commission on Pension 
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Policy (1980, p. 47) recognized that a "social contract" 
exists with people who are approaching retirement age—not 
with everyone already in the workforce. 
Accepting the idea that major changes to the retirement 
system should be partially grandfathered certainly does not 
imply that a similar implicit promise extends to any proposed 
change. In fact, the Concord Coalition rejects the idea that 
implicit promises of COLAs exist at all. The Coalition 
asserts: "The public is not necessarily wed to a 'deal' that 
promises they will collect whatever they're 'entitled to' 
under current law—no matter what the consequences." (Adde, 
September 18, 1995, p. 22) 
Finally, if implicit promises actually do exist, then the 
government would have no obligation to include any active duty 
service members in a proposed change that works to the 
member's advantage. One can only imagine the uproar if the 
government proposed to restore full COLAs to post-1986 
retirees, but excluded everyone already in the service on the 
grounds that a promise of reduced COLAs was agreed to at the 
time of the person's entry into the military. 
This discussion concludes by reiterating the distinction 
between implicit contracts and promises. DoD's implicit 
contract exists with mid-careerists and indicates that service 
members in good standing will not normally be involuntarily 
separated after about 12 YOS.  The actions of the services 
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over the years have validated this concept. Implicit 
promises, on the other hand, are vague notions that the 
retirement provisions in effect at the time of joining the 
military cannot be changed during an entire career. The cry 
of "implicit promise" typically arises when no other 
compelling argument is available. 
D.  BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS 
The need for military retirement reform has been 
highlighted by the nation's $5 trillion debt. But even if no 
annual budget deficit existed, changes to the system would be 
warranted simply because "the services must establish pay 
rates that are no higher than needed to achieve recruiting and 
retention goals." (Seventh QRMC, 1992, GSP-F, p. 10) Chapter 
II shows that the current system is too successful at 
retaining mid-careerists. As Asch and Warner (1994, p. 26) 
observe, "the basic criticism of the 20-year system regards 
the force structure that it produces." 
When the generous foundations of the current system were 
established after the Civil War, the Republican platform 
proclaimed that "in the presence of an overflowing treasury, 
it would be a public scandal to do less for those whose 
valorous service preserved the government." (Will, 1995, p. 
9A)   The idea of generosity during abundant times is 
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appealing.  But today, the federal treasury is hardly 
overflowing.  The nature of the "public scandal" may have 
reversed. 
Like all special interest groups in our democratic 
system, the military retirement lobby exerts influence in the 
budget process, yet remains largely unchallenged by other 
groups.  Binkin and Kyriakopoulos (1981, p. 66) offer the 
following observation: 
The constituency favoring retirement reform is 
neither widespread nor well organized. The 
military establishment opposes reform of 
compensation in general and of retirement in 
particular. While the typical taxpayer may feel 
that benefits are overly generous, the feelings 
apparently do not run deep enough to foster active 
citizen involvement. 
But today, as various federal programs compete for fewer 
dollars, supporters of the military system may be required to 
offer  a  stronger  justification  for  its  provisions. 
Justification often centers on the  "X-factor,"  or the 
conditions of employment in military service that differ from 
those in civilian occupations.  The next chapter provides a 
closer look at the so-called X-factor. 
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V.  THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITARY LIFE 
The Seventh QRMC (1992, p. 4) states: "It is reasonable 
to ask whether a compensation system that matured in the 
middle of the twentieth century for a largely conscripted 
force will remain viable into the twenty-first." 
Conscription has not played a central role in the shaping of 
the retirement system, since the career force has always been 
voluntary. Nevertheless, the question of whether the old 
system is appropriate for the future must still be asked. The 
basic structure of the current retirement system—with 
immediate annuities after 20 YOS—has been around since the 
end of the Civil War. Since that time, society has undergone 
tremendous cultural, economic, and technological changes. 
Accordingly, the military of today is immensely different from 
that of Civil War times. 
The next three sections examine areas of military service 
that have changed dramatically over the past 130 years. The 
investigation of the X-factor, second careers, and the 
evolution of warfare can provide useful insight into the 
question of whether or not changes to the current retirement 
system may be fair to service members. 
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A.  THE X-FACTOR 
1.  Negative Aspects 
The X-factor includes aspects of military service that 
are substantially different from civilian employment. 
Discussion of the X-factor focuses almost exclusively on its 
negative side and includes elements such as: 
• Military discipline 
• Family separations 
• Field duty 
• Freguent moves 
• Possibility of combat 
Without a doubt, the X-factor heavily influences a 
person's decision to join the military and, subsequently, 
whether to remain in service past an initial obligation. The 
relevant question is whether the X-factor can or should be 
specifically addressed in the compensation system, and 
particularly in the retirement system. 
Harris (1994, p. 12) states that »the X-factor is an 
integral element in determining military compensation." But 
the United States has never included any payments specifically 
for the X-factor. The X-factor, then, does not determine pay 
in any direct way. As the Congressional Budget Office (1984, 
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p. 15) notes, "it [X-factor] merely explains some of the 
difficulties of meeting military manpower requirements." In 
other words, if an adequate number of recruits join the 
service at a certain level of pay and benefits, one may assume 
that the negative side of the X-factor has been somehow 
offset. The attractions of military service have indirectly 
compensated for the X-factor by virtue of the fact that 
sufficient numbers of qualified people are willing to join. 
Consideration of the X-factor becomes even less 
meaningful when discussed in relation to retired pay. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, withholding payment for the X-factor 
during active-duty, and then providing it during retirement 
would defy common sense. As indicated by Table 5-1, only one 
out of three officers, and one out of eight enlisted members, 
remain on active duty until becoming retirement-eligible. 
Compensating only retirees for the X-factor would be 
quite callous to the vast majority who do not retire, 
especially the ones who have fought the nation's battles. But 
when viewed properly as a force management tool, retired pay 
should be given only to those whose retention behavior suits 
the services. 
The idea that the X-factor should not be considered when 
discussing the retirement system is very difficult for many 
service members to accept. In arguing against proposals to 
reduce retiree COLAs, The Retired Officers Association 
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Table 5-1 
Expected Percentage of Military Entrants Remaining Until 
Retirement, by Officer/Enlisted Status and Service, 1990 
Service Officers Enlisted 
Army 35 10 
Navy 25 13 
Marine Corps 25 10 
Air Force 40 16 
DoD Average 31 12 
Source: Asch and Warner, 1994, pp. 11, 16. 
president states: "These proposals completely ignore the 
extensive sacrifices inherent in a 20- to 30-year military 
career •■  (Maze, 1995, p. 6)  But the extensive sacrifices 
(the X-factor) had already been compensated for during the 
career, as evidenced by the retention behavior. (Of course, 
retention behavior is often driven by the "pull" of retirement 
benefits.) The criterion of fairness—that it be free from 
emotional involvement—is nowhere clearer than in this debate 
over retired pay. Only when service members can free 
themselves from the "X-factor trap" can they accurately 
evaluate the fairness of the retirement system. 
Finally, if the X-factor is  contemplated, then it might 
be considered in its historical context. The "dis-amenities" 
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of serving today are certainly much less severe than existed 
100, 50, or even 20 years ago. Family separations are 
mitigated somewhat by fast mail service and modern 
telecommunications. Current concerns for housing, day care, 
spousal employment, family health care, and so on have 
resulted in a continuing focus on "quality of life" by the 
nation's military and political leaders. A majority of 
service members now live off-base. In short, military service 
is seen by some as becoming more of an "occupation" and less 
of an "institution."  (Faris, 1995, p. 411) 
2.  Positive Aspects 
As noted, the X-factor is normally viewed as encompassing 
the hardships of military service. Clearly, though, military 
service also contains positive aspects that distinguish it 
from civilian employment. A partial list of these "psychic 
benefits" includes: 
• Service to country 
• Pride in the uniform 
• Sense of self-worth 
• Development of leadership skills 
• Variety of jobs 
• World-wide experiences 
43 
Among those who join the service, the anticipated 
positive  aspects  of  military  life  must  appear  to 
counterbalance the anticipated negative aspects.  Of course, 
many people misjudge their "taste" for military life and are 
either discharged prematurely or leave after their initial 
obligation.  But military members who reenlist, again and 
again until becoming retirement-eligible, have obviously 
demonstrated a very strong taste for service life. For them, 
the psychic benefits of serving are enough to offset the 
negative X-factor.  The voluntary nature of service makes it 
so.  If service members were drafted  for an entire career, 
compensation for the X-factor would be justified in the form 
of retired pay.  But retirees remained in service precisely 
because they had a strong taste for military life (relative to 
those who got out); so, any additional compensation for the X- 
factor during retirement would be gratuitous.  The retirement 
system needs to provide enough incentive for the services to 
meet their personnel retention goals and provide a "socially 
acceptable" level of pay during old-age. (MCBP, 1991 p. 447) 
Anything above that amount may constitute an unfair burden to 
the taxpayer. 
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B.  SECOND CAREERS 
As the military becomes more technological, more skills 
acquired by its members are transferrable to the civilian 
labor market. A nineteenth or early twentieth century retiree 
likely acquired few marketable skills while in the service. 
Today, however, the overwhelming majority of military members 
do not serve in combat arms occupations. Also, owing to an 
increased level of health and life expectancy, today's young 
military retirees are better equipped to enter a second career 
than were their predecessors. 
Numerous studies have found a second career income loss 
for military retirees. That is, the retirees generally tend 
to earn less than their comparably aged and educated civilian 
counterparts. Part of this difference is undoubtedly 
attributable to a voluntary decision to work less (more 
leisure) for some military retirees. But these same studies 
found that total second-career income (including military 
retired pay) exceeds the income of the civilian counterparts. 
(CBO, 1984, p. 16) Therefore, some reformers have suggested 
that retired pay during the second-career phase (prior to age 
62) should be set at a level that iust compensates for the 
second career earnings loss.  (Asch and Warner, 1994, p. 31) 
In short, productive second careers for young military 
retirees have become commonplace in recent years, and this 
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will certainly continue in the future. A military retirement 
system that was designed and implemented when second careers 
were impractical is probably not the fairest system under 
these dramatically changed conditions. As retired Army 
General William Dupuy states, "the idea of 40-year-old people 
'retiring1 is repugnant to the taxpayer and incompatible with 
the American work ethic." (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1981, p. 
71) Of course, General Dupuy realizes that military retirees 
do not »retire» in the strict sense. In the interest of 
fairness, the time has come for the retirement system to 
reflect the dual-career nature of modern military retirees. 
C.  THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE 
Of the many individual factors that collectively 
constitute the X-factor, perhaps none is more significant than 
the obligation to participate in war. Even if a service 
member never actually engages in combat, the possibility of 
war is always present during a military career. Therefore, an 
issue that can produce some insight into the nature of 
military life is whether the danaers of war have been 
increasing or diminishing over time. A related issue is 
whether the likelihood of serving during a war is growing or 
declining. 
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1.  Less Deadly 
Despite enormous increases in the lethality of modern 
weapons, modern wars fail to produce higher casualty rates 
than more "primitive" wars. The reason is surprisingly 
simple: modern tactics have adapted to the weapons, resulting 
in an extremely high degree of dispersion on the battlefield. 
Dupuy (1980, p. 310) calculates that while the lethality of 
modern military formations has increased by a factor of 2000, 
dispersion has increased by a factor of 4000. 
This tendency is reflected in the recent history of 
warfare in the United States. Citing the five major wars of 
the past 130 years, DoD compiled casualty data that are 
compared in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 
Comparison of Death Rates in Principal U.S. Wars 








365 2,213 165.0 
WWI 117 4,735 24.7 
WWII 405 16,113 25.1 
Korea 37 5,720 6.5 
Vietnam 58 8,744 6.1 
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Selected Manpower 
Statistics,   1994, p. 112. 
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The clear trend is a diminishing probability of death 
during wartime. Of course, the incredibly low number of 
deaths during Operation Desert Shield/Storm is an 
extraordinary example of this trend. 
2.  Less Likely 
In The   Evolution   of   Modern   Warfare    (1990, p. 239) , 
historian Christopher Bellamy comments: 
Major war, involving total commitment, between 
developed nations has become such a staggeringly 
costly and complex process that it is almost 
impossible to imagine it being used as a political 
instrument in the future....Most nations no longer 
accept war as a relatively natural aspect of 
international relations. The mere fact that 
earlier this century the United States had a 'War 
Department', the United Kingdom a 'War Office" and 
Russia a 'War Ministry', but that they all now have 
Departments or Ministries of Defence underlies 
this....It [reflects] a profound reappraisal of the 
role of armed conflict in international relations. 
Bellamy is not the only historian or strategist to declare an 
end to all-out war.  Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
U.S. military strategy has been reevaluated, and the consensus 
is that, 
The United States and other countries most likely 
will encounter comparative 'little' wars that have 
specific, relatively limited objectives. The U.S. 
military calls them 'low-intensity conflicts' or 
LICs.  (Alexander, 1995, p. 45) 
The problem for the U.S. is determining which LICs merit our 
participation.  In his National Security Strategy  (1995, p. 
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12) , President Clinton outlines eight questions to be answered 
before deciding to employ U.S. forces: 
• Can non-military means achieve success? 
• Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? 
• What is the environment of risk? 
• What is needed to achieve our goals? 
• What are the potential human and financial costs? 
• Do we have public and Congressional support? 
• Do we have timeliness and milestones that will reveal 
the extent of success or failure? 
• Do we have an exit strategy? 
Such stringent, self-imposed requirements for committing 
force are the product of a deep, national sentiment that 
loathes American casualties.  General Schwarzkopf's decision 
to delay a ground war with Iraq until completion of six weeks 
of intense aerial bombardment was a product of this same 
sentiment. Alexander (1995, p. 65) succinctly describes this 
attitude: 
Firepower has been the preferred choice because 
Americans abhor high casualties and would rather 
swap dollars for lives. As a result, the U.S. 
military has gained great public support by 
substituting shells, bombs, rockets, and bullets 
for high human losses in battle. 
Not only is warfare in general becoming less deadly due to 
dispersion, but American war in particular is becoming less 
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deadly because of the deep national sentiment that "abhors" 
having U.S. casualties. 
The point of this entire discussion of the X-factor, 
second careers, and the evolution of warfare is that over the 
past 130 years, the very nature of life in the U.S. military 
has changed dramatically. The changes have all been to the 
benefit of the service member. The structure of the present 
retirement system was instituted in the aftermath of our 
nation's bloodiest war, then reaffirmed immediately after our 
second costliest war. Now that the nature of military life 
has been substantially transformed, reexamination of the 
fairness of the retirement system is certainly justified. A 
dispassionate and objective examination reveals that the 
present system is more generous than it needs to be to achieve 
its purpose, and that consideration of the risks and 
sacrifices inherent in a career generally fail to account for 
the tremendous positive changes that have occurred over the 
past century. 
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VI.  CHANGING THE SYSTEM 
Nearly ten years have elapsed since the last change to 
the military retirement system. Another ten years will elapse 
before anyone actually retires under that system. Future 
reformers may well insist on reaping the benefits of their new 
plan sooner than 20 years from its inception. If that is to 
be accomplished, the plan must be carefully crafted to 
accommodate the needs of the Services, the taxpayers, and the 
retirees. Not only must the plan be sound, it must also be 
presented in a manner that will encourage acceptance. 
A.  IDENTIFY THE NEED 
The fiscal 1996 Budget Resolution contained language that 
would change the retirement system for members who entered the 
service prior to September 1980. The proposal (known as High- 
1) would calculate retired pay based on the average of the 
member's highest 12 months' basic pay, rather than on terminal 
basic pay. The reaction to High-1 was intense, and the 
proposal later died in Congress. The level of reaction seemed 
to be out of proportion to the relatively minor proposed 
change. With that in mind, it may seem as though even more 
substantial reform would have little chance of becoming law. 
However, closer examination reveals that the reaction to High- 
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1 was not so much directed at the change itself, but rather at 
the abrupt manner in which it was presented to retirees. 
High-1 was not the result of any determination that the 
retirement system needed to be changed.  This simple fact 
accounts for much of the vehement reaction that followed. 
Indeed, the president of The Retired Officers Association had 
just recently acknowledged that some compromises would be 
necessary concerning reductions to retired pay. (Burlage, May 
29, 1995, p. 21) The authors of High-1 failed to realize that 
before such a change can be successfully implemented, the need 
for change must be clearly established first.  The personnel 
drawdown within DoD from 1992 through 1995 provides an example 
of the dramatic change that is possible when the need is 
identified first.  Many service members had their careers 
terminated unexpectedly through Selective Early Retirement 
Boards (SERBs), strict High-Year Tenure (HYT) rules, and 
stringent reenlistment qualifications. But the need for major 
change was made clear far in advance, and the drawdown 
proceeded smoothly. The victims of SERBs and HYTs would have 
reacted quite differently had they simply been identified as 
a source of savings, rather than part of an effort to 
drastically change the structure of the military. 
The lesson from High-1 for future reformers is clear— 
identify the need to change the retirement system first, and 
then seek the best alternative.  The history of military 
52 
retirement reform reveals that this approach has not been used 
in the past, resulting in study after study upon which no 
action was taken. 
B.  SELL THE NEED 
The extensive literature on organizational change conveys 
a clear message: successful change cannot simply be dictated 
from above.  Kirkpatrick (1985, p. 133) identifies three 
factors in the process of change: 
Empathy, the first key, requires a manager to 
determine feelings and reactions to a change. 
Communication, the second key, requires the manager 
to maintain continuous, complete, and clear 
communication with all persons affected by the 
change. The third key, participation, requires a 
manager to get involvement from those concerned 
with and affected by the change. 
The experience with High-1 suggests that the proponents 
of reform were not especially concerned with empathy, 
communication, or participation.  All three factors reflect 
the underlying requirement that a change be perceived as fair 
to all involved. Future reformers must be sensitive to these 
perceptions and should realize that the manner in which a 
change is presented will make an enormous difference in how 
the proposal is received. This concept was recognized by the 
Seventh QRMC (1992, GSP-F, p. 11) concerning changes to the 
compensation system: 
53 
When changes are made (positive or negative) , 
adequate explanations should be given to the 
members as far in advance of the change as 
possible. Most military members will accept the 
need even for negative change once the reasons are 
made clear to them. 
C.  ACCEPT LIMITATIONS 
As mentioned, lack of sensitivity to fairness is an 
obstacle to successful retirement reform.  A less obvious, 
though equally potent obstacle is that of preoccupation with 
fairness.  Chapter IV demonstrates that fairness is a broad 
issue with many shades of meaning.  People with differing 
goals are likely to interpret fairness in different ways. 
Therefore, creating a reform proposal that is perfectly fair 
to all concerned is unrealistic—fortunately, it is also 
unnecessary. Several recent changes to retirement policy have 
been successful despite their apparent unfairness.   For 
example,  the Voluntary  Separation  Incentive  (VSI)  and 
Selective Separation Bonus (SSB) were used to induce mid- 
careerists to separate before becoming retirement-eligible. 
However, they were offered to a very narrowly defined group, 
with eligibility being determined by branch of service, grade, 
occupation, time-in-service, and even promotion zone status. 
Similarly, 15-year retirement was not offered across-the- 
board; rather, it was directed at a very specific group of 
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service members. (It was not entirely voluntary either.) Had 
the drawdown planners been adamant about maintaining perfect 
equity, they never could have accomplished their force 
reduction goals. Although many service members may have 
wished they had been offered a separation incentive, the 
feelings were not strong enough to create any sort of 
backlash. 
The Seventh QRMC hints at a preoccupation with perfect 
fairness. They are critical of the situation that will exist 
in the year 2006 when two individuals who entered the service 
only days apart are subject to "dramatically" different 
retirement plans (High-3 versus REDUX). They state, "Clearly, 
there seems to be some potential for [retirement] policy to 
divide the force." (Seventh QRMC, 1992, p. 144) Yet, each 
individual made a career choice based on a particular 
retirement plan; and establishing some arbitrary cutoff date 
is unavoidable. Furthermore, although the individual who 
entered under REDUX will receive less of an annuity at 20 
years, this person will receive more for each year of military 
service beyond 20. The incentive will exist to stay beyond 20 
years, just as planned. How this difference would divide the 
force is not clear. If future reformers insist on eliminating 
all such discrepancies, chances for meaningful change are slim 




VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Today's federal budget crisis is prompting a 
reexamination of many entitlement programs. The cost of the 
military retirement system has risen to $26.8 billion in 1994, 
making it a lucrative target for the budget-cutters. This new 
scrutiny has resurfaced many of the longstanding criticisms of 
military retirement, foremost of which is the young age at 
which service members can retire and receive immediate 
annuities. The fact that the average retiree collects 
benefits for about 35 years after leaving the military means 
that the number of retirees will not significantly decline in 
the near future. Other prominent criticisms of military 
retirement include the generous level of annual benefits and 
the cliff-vesting provision at 20 years. 
None of the issues raised in the current debate over 
military retirement are new. Eight major studies of the 
retirement system were conducted from 1969 to 1984. All of 
the studies recommended dramatic changes to the system, such 
as requiring members to make contributions or imposing a 30- 
year minimum for retirement in non-combat occupations. Common 
recommendations include ten-year vesting in old-age benefits, 
a social security offset, and a substantially reduced level of 
benefits during a retiree's second career phase (prior to age 
62) . 
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The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (REDUX) was 
the collective result of previous studies. However, the 
changes made by REDUX were relatively mild compared with those 
recommended in some of the studies. REDUX has been 
characterized as a "compromise1' that did not fundamentally 
alter the structure of the retirement system. 
Any attempt to replace REDUX or modify the rules for 
current retirees is sure to be assailed on the grounds of 
fairness. However, the concept of fairness is not restricted 
to retirees; military non-retirees and U.S. taxpayers must 
also be considered when discussing the fairness of the system. 
Determining the purpose of the retirement system is 
necessary before deciding whether any particular change is 
fair.  Government studies over the past several decades have 
mentioned numerous purposes for military retirement, but the 
primary purpose cited is always force management.   The 
services must be able to retain sufficient numbers of mid- 
career personnel.  Furthermore, adequate incentive must be 
provided so that service members will separate voluntarily at 
some point, thus maintaining the "youth and vigor" of the 
force.  The present retirement system certainly provides the 
incentive to separate shortly after becoming eligible.  The 
criticism is that the lure of retirement is so strong that an 
implicit contract is established with mid-careerists, allowing 
too many of them to remain in the service. 
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The fact that the military is structured as an internal 
labor market (virtually all recruiting is done at the entry 
level) allows it to utilize principles of deferred 
compensation. This economic concept supports the notion that 
the primary purpose of retired pay is to induce the desired 
retention behavior from the individual. Consequently, 
deferred compensation also induces high levels of work effort, 
by delaying payments until the employee has been observed over 
a long period of time. 
Attempting to determine the fairness of a system 
naturally leads to comparisons with other, similar systems. 
The U.S. military retirement system is commonly compared with 
those of various foreign militaries as well as with private 
U.S. plans. The consistent conclusion is that U.S. military 
retirement is more generous than that of most foreign nations 
and much more generous than most private U.S. plans. Of 
course, the comparisons do not provide perfect information 
since many differences exist between the groups. Still, large 
disparities could be one indication that U.S. military 
retirement may be overly generous. 
Another dimension of the fairness issue is reflected in 
the concepts of implicit contracts and implicit promises. A 
common belief among service members is that 20-year cliff- 
vesting produces an implicit contract between DoD and mid- 
careerists.  The behavior of the Services over the years has 
59 
validated this belief. In particular, the separation 
incentives offered during the force drawdown reveal the 
strength and constancy of the implicit contract. A much less 
demonstrable notion is that of implicit promises. Some 
retirees and their supporters claim that the exact retirement 
provisions in place at the time of entry into the military 
cannot be changed for the rest of that person's life. The 
claim of implicit promises is frequently made with regard to 
COLAs. However, no historical or logical evidence is 
available to support the claim of implicit promises. 
Military retirement provisions are sometimes justified on 
the grounds that they are compensation for the many 
disadvantages inherent in a military career (the X-factor). 
Yet, the vast majority of service members do not remain until 
retirement; they do, of course, suffer the same disadvantages 
as the retirees (albeit for shorter duration). The idea that 
retired pay is somehow a reward for the rigors endured during 
a military career has little merit, and was specifically 
rejected by the First QRMC. 
Another argument advanced to justify retired pay is that 
military retirees typically experience a second-career income 
loss, relative to comparably-aged and educated civilians. 
This argument overlooks the fact that part of the income loss 
is voluntary (a decision to work less than full time) . 
Importantly, total   second-career income (including retired 
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pay) of military retirees typically exceeds that of civilian 
counterparts. 
Further insight into the fairness of military retirement 
is provided by a historical perspective. That is, tremendous 
changes have occurred since the present retirement system was 
established that have greatly improved service members' 
quality of life.  In short, military life simply is not as 
»tough« as it used to be.  Also, warfare has become less 
dangerous,  owing to modern tactics  and the pervading 
unwillingness  of  Americans  to  sustain  casualties. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that the retirement 
system should change, in light of the dramatic technological, 
cultural, and economic changes that have improved military 
life over the past 130 years. 
Nevertheless, changing a system as cherished as military 
retirement is no easy task. Reformers must first clearly 
identify the need for change, and then work diligently to 
convince retirees that the change is fair. Recent attempts to 
modify retired pay (High-1) failed miserably because reformers 
focused solely on immediate savings rather than on 
articulating the need for change and managing the change 
process. 
This entire discussion of military retirement reveals 
that current benefits (both pre- and post-REDUX) could be 
reduced  while  remaining  fair  to  the  service  member. 
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Obviously, fairness to the taxpayer dictates that current 
provisions should change. Nearly any standard of fairness— 
the needs of the Services, comparisons with others, or the 
nature of military life—supports modifying the current 
system. Although retroactive changes must be done carefully, 
no compelling argument of fairness exists to preclude them. 
Finally, service members should take care to avoid the 
"X-factor trap" when defending retired pay. The sacrifices 
made during a military career are indeed noble, but 
compensation for those sacrifices is not achieved through 
retired pay. 
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